In the preamble to this two-part series, Peter Drucker cautioned against the perils of applying yesterday’s logic to today’s problems. Yet much of the commentary by former employees of Kenya Airways falls precisely into this trap, advancing remedies that events have already rendered obsolete. The five claims that follow, put forward as expert aviation analysis and concluding this series, are at odds with publicly available facts and do not withstand scrutiny.
1. CLAIM: KQ’s fleet groundings stem from poor maintenance planning.
VERDICT: False.
The grounding of aircraft is not a peculiarity of Kenya Airways but a post-pandemic affliction that has spread across the global aviation industry. After more than a year of COVID-19 shutdowns, aircraft manufacturers curtailed production while skilled workers dispersed, some to other jobs, others into retirement. The result has been a tangle of supply-chain bottlenecks: prolonged lead times for essential spares such as rotables and consumables, overstretched maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities – particularly for engines – and fierce competition for scarce inventory.
Large airlines, cushioned by scale, have found ways to cope. Some deploy spare aircraft from their fleet to cover for those delayed in maintenance. Others have bought new planes simply to cannibalise them for parts, a practice known in the trade as “rob-to-service.” A few have even kept ageing aircraft such as the fuel-hungry four-engine Airbus A340, flying well past intended retirement, judging inefficiency preferable to inactivity.
Kenya Airways, like most smaller carriers, enjoys no such latitude. Its predicament is not one of deficient planning but of limited scale. To soften the impact, the airline has partnered with Lufthansa Technik to provide comprehensive component support, an acknowledgement that the problem is structural, not managerial.
2. CLAIM: KQ has prioritized its passenger business at the expense of cargo, forfeiting a more lucrative revenue stream to foreign carriers.
VERDICT: False
Far from neglecting cargo, KQ has expanded it. Over the past two years, the airline has doubled its dedicated freighter fleet from two Boeing 737s to four 737-800s, a tacit acknowledgement of cargo’s growing importance to airline economics. In some markets, freight can generate up to 40 per cent more revenue than passenger services. It is worth noting that beyond its fleet of dedicated freighters, KQ utilises the belly-hold capacity of its passenger aircraft to transport cargo, thereby extracting additional value from its scheduled services.
Grounded in error – Ten fallacies about Kenya Airways (Part one)
That said, cargo economics are shaped as much by directionality as by volume. Although Nairobi is the region’s largest cargo export hub by tonnage, traffic flows are overwhelmingly one-way. Many of KQ’s destinations generate little inbound freight, a constraint that requires careful calibration of fleet size and deployment.
Nor can KQ be held responsible for the periodic shortage of freighter capacity out of Nairobi. These episodes largely reflect global market dynamics; established cargo operators have deployed aircraft to higher-yielding jurisdictions, particularly in the Far East, where shippers pay as much as USD 8 per kilogram compared with USD 1.80 – 2 from Nairobi. In such a market, capacity follows price, not neglect.
3. CLAIM: KQ’s aircraft are underutilised. Rivals extract more value from their fleets by flying longer hours, while KQ sacrifices profitability through lower utilization.
VERDICT: False.
For three consecutive years, Kenya Airways has led not only its region but the world in the utilisation of the Boeing 737. Its Embraer 190 fleet ranks among the global top five, while utilisation of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner sits broadly in line with international averages, despite constraints in spare parts. Far from idling its assets, KQ operates them at levels that compare favourably with the industry’s best.
4. CLAIM: Kenya Airways earns less revenue than its northern neighbours because it handles fewer transit passengers through its hub.
VERDICT: False.
The claim rests on a narrow view of what constitutes a successful hub. Some of KQ’s regional competitors operate hubs that function largely as transit nodes akin to bus termini optimised for moving passengers swiftly from one flight to another. Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) serves an added purpose. It is not merely a conduit but a destination in its own right.
Misleading headlines, missed context: a case for responsible aviation reporting
Passengers arrive in Nairobi to access Kenya’s beaches and safari circuits, as well as its mountains, deserts, lakes and the Great Rift Valley – all within hours of landing. Beyond tourism, JKIA draws substantial point-to-point traffic linked to Nairobi’s role as a diplomatic and commercial centre. The presence of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), headquartered in the city, alongside numerous multinational firms, generates steady demand for business travel.
In short, KQ’s hub supports a more diversified traffic mix than a pure transit model. Measuring the airline’s performance solely by transit volumes therefore understates both its strategic value and the revenue potential it confers.
5. CLAIM: KQ lacks the technical and financial expertise to negotiate competitive aircraft lease rates and therefore pays above industry norms.
VERDICT: False.
Aircraft lease rates are shaped less by negotiating power than by market conditions. At present, the global aviation market is characterised by an acute shortage of aircraft, for both finance and operating leases. In such an environment, aircraft, new and used alike, are allocated on a first-come, first-served basis, governed by logic of willing buyers and willing sellers. Prices observed in one year offer little guidance to those prevailing in the next.
Lease pricing is also sensitive to the perceived risk of the lessee. Smaller airlines, typically those operating fewer than 50 aircraft, are judged riskier than large fleet operators and consequently pay a premium for access to scarce capacity. Airlines based in oil-rich states, or those able to pay lease obligations upfront, enjoy more favourable terms than carriers dependent on commercial borrowing. The industry, in short, does not operate on uniform benchmarks. Lease costs reflect the financial standing of each airline, or, where available, the strength of government guarantees rather than any presumed lack of technical or financial competence.
